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Abstract. By using a unique database on the ownership relations of Swiss firms, this article 
proposes, for the first time in Switzerland, a spatial analysis of financial links. More precisely, 
it proposes a study of specific regional characteristics in that it reveals the way in which 
ownership is structured. The paper clearly highlights the different ways that regions behave 
regarding their involvement in these ownership structures, on a national and international 
level. The types of behaviour can be associated with the various economic specialisations of 
Switzerland's regions. Firstly, it appears that ownership most frequently links firms located 
within the same Regional Production System. It is then noted that the links between the Swiss 
regions are far less numerous than international links. The international links, by their number 
and their distribution throughout Switzerland, constitute the main source of discrimination 
between the regions. The financial region of Zurich masters this ownership issue most 
competently. It is the most autonomous region in that it is able to maintain control over its 
economy, to become highly involved in other spaces, and attract the most investments.  
JEL classification: G34, L22, R12 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Regional endogenous development requires a certain degree of regional "autonomy" in order 
to be effective. By autonomy, we mean the capacity of a firm to operate relations within its 
own region or with other, more remote regions(Grosjean and Crevoisier, 2003). Autonomy is 
therefore the contrary of autarchy (which means no relations with others): it is a capacity to 
act with, and on, the environment (Varela, 1989). 
In regional endogenous development approaches (Regional Production Systems, industrial 
districts, innovative milieus, etc.), regional autonomy is necessary because it allows local 
interaction to take place in order to build local resources and to innovate.    2
During the last 20 years, the development of the financial system and its growing impact on 
the real economy is raising new questions about regional autonomy and about the limits of 
endogenous development theories. Disintermediation has forced SMEs and family-owned 
firms to find new equity capital. At the same time, financial markets are providing better 
access to capital for large companies that use the stock exchanges for this purpose. The 
consequence of these developments is an increased integration and concentration of corporate 
ownership as a result of mergers acquisitions. In France for example, Chabanas (2002) shows 
that the number of controlled firms was four times higher in 1999 than in 1980. 
In such a context, one could in fact wonder whether regional autonomy still exists, and thus 
whether and to what extent endogenous development theories can still be upheld. The "Global 
City" approach (Sassen, 1991) shows how financial activities have developed in a highly 
concentrated way and consequently the way in which financial centres have concentrated their 
control over a globalised economy.  Since these global cities control a significant part of the 
economy, this naturally means that other regions have at least partially lost their autonomy. 
Here, a  theory of economic and spatial dependence, such as the spatial division of labour, is 
needed (Massey, 1984).  
In this article, we address the question of regional autonomy by means of an analysis of 
regional, inter-regional and international corporate ownership in Switzerland.  
Switzerland has experienced a considerable transformation of its economy over the last 20 
years. The international and national financial centres have grown considerably,  and in 
parallel, industry and tourism have encountered difficulties. From a geographical point of 
view, the Regional Production Systems (RPSs) that constituted the financial centres (Zurich, 
Geneva, and to a lesser extent Lugano and Basel) have developed, while RPSs that focused on 
exports have undergone a decline (Corpataux et al., 2003; Crevoisier et al., 2001). 
In this paper, autonomy is not viewed in the sense of autarchy but rather as the  capacity to 
handle external relationships. The second part of it will therefore address the notion of 
autonomy in relation to ownership structures. Starting with Sassen’s "Global City" concept 
and summarising the topic of ownership topic in literature concerning RPSs, it proposes a 
typology of regional autonomy based on the various types of inter-regional ownership 
(controlling regions, controlled regions, etc.) that can be observed. If all firms within a region 
are controlled from outside it, the region concerned could be considered as one with a low 
degree of autonomy – yet how should regions with a high degree of control but also with 
numerous dependency relationships be regarded?  
The third section describes data on ownership, followed by a brief description of the region 
analysed (RPSs of Switzerland), and then by an explanation of the method used. The fourth 
section resumes the main results obtained. The performances of the RPSs are evaluated on a 
national and international level before presenting the overall results and the basic constraints 
of the study. The final section recalls the main results and refers to the theoretical approaches 
used.  
   3
2  CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND REGIONS: THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
Naturally, corporate control through ownership does not necessarily prevent autonomy in 
everyday management. Abundant literature is available on the behaviour of subsidiaries of 
large groups that involve local players. This type of behaviour can be simply a predation of 
local resources but also one of developing common resources and innovation (see for instance 
Perrat, 1992; Saxenian, 1996). Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the event of financial 
problems or if a local plant needs funds for its development, the shareholders maintain a say 
in the matter.  
Although the more general theme of autonomy appears relatively frequently in literature on 
regional development, the question of corporate ownership and regional ownership control as 
such appears rarely. Indeed, the independence of firms can be interpreted as local 
entrepreneurial dynamism (for instance in literature on industrial districts) but also as 
backwardness (in literature on the financial markets). Being owned by a group may been seen 
as dependence (in literature on RPSs), exploitation (in the theory of spatial division of labour) 
or attractiveness and dynamism (in the "Neo-classic" or "Global City" approaches). For this 
reasons, it is vital to grasp the various key theoretical approaches in order to make sense out 
of the notion of ownership control. In this study, the Neo-classical approach, literature on 
Regional Production Systems (RPSs), the Global City concept and the Spatial Division of 
Labour (SDL) theory are taken into consideration.  
In a world of models, structured according to Neo-classical hypotheses, the ownership 
relation can be simply considered as an investment. The investor allocates his capital to a firm 
that unites the characteristics of returns and risks in a way that he deems appropriate. Here, 
the attractiveness of the firm that receives the investment is the decisive factor. The 
investment is made in it because it is considered to be the best investment opportunity 
available on the market. The notion of transferring property is not essential here: it is more the 
returns hoped for and the risks associated with the firm that are decisive
1. On a national level, 
the allocative process is often considered to have the virtue of harmonising the per capita 
revenues of the various regions (the convergence  theory), since the capital is oriented 
according to its regional marginal productivity, which itself is dependent on the value of the 
capital/labour ratio.  
Literature on Regional Production Systems (RPS) (industrial districts, techopoles, innovative 
milieus, etc.) focuses on endogenous development processes. Local forms of interaction and 
learning are viewed as the result of strategies that are drawn up locally. Usually, it is 
considered that this takes place in line with considerable decision-taking power on the part of 
local actors. Obviously, financial independence is part of this autonomy. If the place where 
decisions are taken and the place where regional interaction and learning occur coincide, this 
understandably favours coherent local dynamics. Nevertheless, this freedom does not 
necessarily mean that independent or regionally controlled firms automatically take part in 
                                                 
1 Some heterodox approaches strongly criticise this concept of the choices by investors. A preference for liquid assets (Dow, 
1999) or mimetic mechanisms (Orléan, 1999) constitute factors that question the pertinence of the classical explanatory 
factors of capital allocation. This article does not take the alternative approaches into consideration, since it is not a study of 
the allocation process but rather its implications on the systems (regional autonomy).   4
these dynamics. Inversely, external ownership control does not always prevent dynamic 
participation in local learning. The way in which large firms' subsidiaries operate within 
regional production systems has given birth to hundreds of surveys and interpretations. On the 
one hand, it is clear that the subsidiary of a group does not take part exclusively in a regional 
or a branch dynamic: it must also deal with corporate management, which has its own 
development strategy (Dupuy and Gilly, 1995). This considerably hampers the capacity of 
subsidiaries to nurture endogenous development. Nevertheless, and on the other hand, several 
authors (see for instance Crevoisier, 1995; Perrat, 1992; Bathelt, 2000) stress that subsidiaries 
can also be part of local innovative dynamics. This behaviour appears at certain, limited 
periods of time, when a group is seeking new techniques, products or resources. When 
innovative projects have matured, accumulation dynamics that are dependent on major 
investment capacities make them shift. External control becomes decisive at this point in 
order to organise the various components of the value chain at a much wider spatial scale. 
These phenomena are not taken into consideration by literature on RPSs.   
Another interesting way to consider regional autonomy consists of taking into consideration 
the location of the owners of large firms that have their headquarters in the region (Wòjcik, 
2002). In this case, regional autonomy is not referred to as a means of maintaining 
competitiveness through a better match between collective innovation processes and decision-
taking power, but to as a form of corporate governance that corresponds to the interests of the 
region’s economic players. 
The way in which multi-regional or multi-national firms organise their controlled subsidiaries 
over space is explained by the Spatial Division of Labour (SDL) theory (Massey, 1984). In 
this theory, labour is seen as a resource used and controlled by capital. Ownership structures 
play a decisive role because this is the most obvious way in which the different kinds of 
labour are integrated within a more general production system. Regions are not autonomous: 
each one has a position in a more widespread organization, and this organisation is 
orchestrated by large, multi-regional or multi-national companies exerting direct (for example 
through ownership) or indirect (for example through market power) control. The spatial 
division of labour is both functional (functions are shared among regions according to 
specialised skills) and hierarchical (headquarters employing skilled workers are located in 
regions that are at the top of the spatial division of labour chain) (Hoeschele, 2002), while 
routine operations that require non-skilled workers are located in regions that are at the lowest 
level of this chain.  
By structuring spatial hierarchical structures and autonomous development in the form of 
centres, the Sassen's "Global City" (Sassen, 1991) aims to explain why and how the increased 
dispersion of economic activity took place hand in hand with a growing need for global 
integration and control. This brought about new functions for the major cities of the world: 
they became command centres for global economic activity and the production systems that 
produce precisely the expertise and the means that make this global control possible. 
Consequently, the increased dispersion of economic activity took place in parallel with 
increased spatial concentration regarding ownership. Sassen argues that the reorganisation of 
the financial industry has been characterised by sharp growth and innovation on the part of 
financial firms, and by their proliferation. These conditions have shifted the point of gravity in 
the industry away from the large trans-national banks that once dominated the industry 
towards major centres  of finance. Sassen shows how the transition to a finance-driven 
economy generates new economic spaces.   5
These widely differing theoretical approaches no doubt each explain one part of reality. They 
at least reveal that ownership can be interpreted in different – if not contradictory – ways. 
This is no doubt simply due to the fact that ownership is an ambivalent relationship that takes 
on two aspects without opposition or ambiguity being necessarily present. First of all, it is the 
proof of the attractiveness of the target firm, since this has led to investments on the part of 
the entity acquiring it. However, it is also a relationship of power that implies a transfer of the 
decision-taking autonomy of the target company to the entity acquiring it.  
Thus, the definition of the autonomous region par excellence is that one that benefits from 
grouping together the strategic and best-remunerated activities by placing itself at the summit 
of the hierarchy (Sassen and SDL), that attracts investments to it by offering good prospects 
for returns at low risk (classical vision) and finally, that succeeds in preserving control over 
the economic fabric that creates its competitive advantage (RPS).  
 TABLE 1: INTERPRETATION OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP IN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT THEORIES 
  Regional control  Inter-regional control  International control  Independent firms 
Ownership
Theories 
Ownership under own 
regional control * 
To control ownership in 
other regions* 
Ownership controlled 
from other regions* 
To control ownership 
in other countries* 
Ownership controlled 




Place where decisions are 
taken and the place where 
regional interaction and 
learning occur coincide: 
favours coherent local 
dynamics. 
Successful RPSs take over 
competitors and acquire 
upstream and downstream 
activities  
Inward investments occur 
because exogenous firms 
seek access to specific 
resources 
Successful RPSs take 
over competitors and 




exogenous firms seek  
access to specific 
resources 
Place where decisions are 
taken and the place where 
regional interaction and 
learning occur coincide: 
favours coherent local 
dynamics. 
Spatial division of 
labour 
  Central dominant regions 
exploit spatial differences 
in skills and wages 
through corporate 
ownership 
Dependence of local 
subsidiaries maintains the 
region at the lowest level 
of the spatial division of 
labour chain 
Central dominant 
nations exploit spatial 
differences in skills 
and wages through 
corporate ownership 
Dependence of local 
subsidiaries maintains 
the region at the 
lowest level of the 
international division 
of labour chain. 
 
The Global City  Place where decisions are 
taken and the place where 
regional interaction and 
learning occur coincide: 
favours coherent local 
dynamics.. 
National financial centres are paying ever less 
consideration to their Hinterland. 
The growth of a financial centre is closely 
linked to international financial investments 
from and to other financial centres.  
Place where decisions are 
taken and the place where 
regional interaction and 
learning occur coincide: 




Ownership is considered in the same way as any other investment. Investors allocate their capital to the most profitable firms, independently of spatial distance. 
* data taken into account in the database 
** not taken into account in the database 3  DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 DATA 
The data required in order to carry out the varies analyses regarding relations between firms 
was obtained from the Who owns Whom database published by the firm Orell Füssli, which 
specialises in collecting data on companies. The figures are those for January 2003. The main 
criterion used for a company to feature in the database is a minimum share capital of 
CHF 500,000.-
2 or its dependency on a larger firm. The database thus includes companies 
whose equity capital exceeds this threshold and their possessions, whose size may be more 
modest. 
In order to describe these firms more precisely and notably to obtain their location, it is 
necessary to use another database, i.e. the Swiss Directory of the Register of Trade (Annuaire 
suisse du registre du commerce) also by Orell Füssli. Unfortunately, no reliable indication 
regarding the size of these companies is provided. The number of employees or the equity 
capital of the company is mentioned in some cases but not sufficiently regularly for the 
information to be used. Without external sources of data, this forces us to work by adopting 
the highly restrictive hypothesis that these companies are of a uniform size. Moreover, we 
should stress the fact that this database is a rare case in that the names of the companies are 
provided, whereas the custom for such information generally consists of aggregating the data 
in order to preserve their anonymity. Thanks to this factor, it is thus possible to carry out 
research into these companies when the quality of the information (notably regarding their 
size) is not satisfactory. 
The results presented below are based on a table of ownership relations that are strictly over 
50%, i.e. controlling relations. Theoretically, each relation thus implies a transfer of strategic 
decision-taking from the firm formerly owned to the owner firm. After some operations on 
this table, this now lists only relations between the final owners and the owned firms, i.e. 
relations between firms in the possession of others and the entities that have formal control 
over them
3. Regarding ownership by foreign entities, the threshold of 50% (strictly for cases 
where this is exceeded) was also used. It should be noted that unlike in the case of the Swiss 
relations, we do not possess data on equity capital that is owned in other countries by foreign 
firms. The number of foreign companies controlled by the firms is thus underestimated, since 
it is possible that the foreign companies in question in turn control other entities (in 
                                                 
2 approximatly 320'000.- euros. 
3 If A owns (>50%) B and B owns (>50%) C, the final relations are between A and B and between A and C. The relation 
between B and C disappears since, logically, B no longer has decision-taking autonomy.    8
Switzerland or abroad). On the other hand, the final Swiss owner is retained for our purposes, 
as is the case for internal relations in the country
4. 
After selection (relations >50% only) and processing (in order to retain only relations between 
the final owner and what it owns), some 17,456 relations remain. Among these, 7,138 are 
relations of control between Swiss RPSs and 9,019 between RPSs and foreign countries. 
These links are analysed in turn in the sections below.  
3.2 REGIONAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS IN SWITZERLAND 
Usually, studies on the case of Switzerland are based on the politico-administrative 
breakdown by Canton (NUTS 3). Cantons differ largely in population (from 1 to 30!) and are 
not coherent economic entities. That is why the breakdown into regions used for this study is 
that of the RPSs proposed by Crevoisier et al. (2001). The authors identified eleven systems 
in Switzerland (Map 1) that are homogeneous from the point of view of economic 
specialisation: each of them is highly specialised in one or several types of complementary 
activities. Essentially, this identification is based on the analysis of employment localisation 
quotients. Moreover, the quantitative analysis was validated by regional monographs and 
interviews with regional experts in order to pinpoint the most qualitative data on existing 
relations between the various activities.  
MAP 1: THE ELEVEN REGIONAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS IN SWITZERLAND 
Source: Corpataux, Crevoisier and Thierstein (2002) 
The eleven RPSs of Switzerland do not cover the country's entire territory, since it has regions 
that have no specificities in relation to the national structure. As Table 2 shows, the RPSs 
                                                 
4 If ASwitzerland owns BSwitzerland and BSwitzerland owns CForeign, the relation between BSwitzerland and CForeign is deleted in order to 
retain only the relations between the final owner (ASwitzerland) and what it owns (BSwitzerland and CForeign). 
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nevertheless account for 73.1% of the population
5 and 77.8% of jobs
6. The specialised regions 
identified are of highly varying sizes from a surface area, population or employment point of 
view.  
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTION OF THE SWISS RPSS 
Sources: Crevoisier, Corpataux and Thierstein (2001), Federal population censuses in 2000 and establishments census in 2001 
3.3 CALCULATION OF THE INDICES 
In order to compare the various regions, the indices relating to attractiveness, control and own 
control are calculated. The method used is briefly presented below. 
Control index 
Pj is the number of entities controlled by region j outside its territory. The performance index 












Literally, Cj corresponds to the number of inter-regional possessions of region j, divided by 
the average number of inter-regional possessions of the 11 RPSs. The interpretation of the 
index is as follows: when a region possesses an index equal to X, it can be said that it controls 
X times more companies than the average of the RPSs. 
Attractiveness index 
Sj is the number of firms within region j that are controlled from other regions. The 
attractiveness index of regionr j (Aj) is defined by: 
                                                 
5 Civil population, Federal population census, 2000. 
6 Federal establishment census, 2001. 
Specialisation(s)
Jura Watchmaking, jewelery 628,270 8.6% 242,538 7.7%
Basel Chemical industry 494,799 6.8% 248,621 7.9%
Bern Public administration 292,420 4.0% 175,570 5.6%
Geneva Financial activities, international organisations 410,145 5.6% 208,248 6.6%
Graubünden Tourist industry 190,183 2.6% 80,058 2.5%
Lausanne Public administration, tourist industry 481,376 6.6% 200,317 6.4%
Eastern CH Machine and textile industry 1,085,286 14.9% 400,485 12.7%
Oberland Tourist industry 79,550 1.1% 30,284 1.0%
Ticino Tourist industry, financial activities 310,671 4.3% 143,103 4.6%
Valais Tourist industry 279,077 3.8% 101,481 3.2%
Zurich Financial activities 1,076,674 14.8% 615,032 19.6%
Total RPS - 5,328,451 73.1% 2,445,736 77.8%
Switzerland - 7,287,357 100.0% 3,141,778 100.0%











i j j S S A  
Aj is thus equal to the number of companies owned by other regions in region j, divided by 
the average number of companies owned inter-regionally in the RPSs. If Aj = X, it can be said 
that region j is X times more attractive than the average.  
Own control index 
Here, Tj is the total number of owned companies in region j, and Uj is the number of 
companies that region j possesses among these Tj companies
7. This gives the own control 



















Oj is the portion of the companies controlled by region j among the total of controlled firms in 
this region. If Oj = X, it can then be said that in j there is X times more own control of firm 
than in the other regions of Switzerland. 
Weighted indexes 
It is clear that the size of the regional entities considered plays a role and creates bias in the 
analysis if one attempts to measure performances with all other parameters remaining 
constant. This bias, however, also reflects the reality in which production systems of different 
sizes co-exist. For this reason, we present the non-weighted results and the results weighted 
by the size of the regional entities considered in parallel.  
The results regarding control and attractiveness are weighted by the portion that each RPS 
represents in terms of employment. On the other hand, no adjustment has been applied to the 
own control indices. In fact, even if this can depend on the size of the regions, weighting 
would have had little sense. Own control is a notion that is pertinent to the scale of a system, 
whatever its size. Nevertheless, control and attractiveness can doubtlessly be considered as 
dependent on the size of the RPSs. A large RPS will rapidly take on major significance in 
another region (with high level of control), just as a large RPS will rapidly constitute a major 
target for investment for another (with high level of attractiveness). The weighting was made 
by means of the number of jobs located in the regions. 



















                                                 
7 Thus Tj – Uj = Sj.   11



















Thus, if WCj (WAj) is equal to X, it can be said that in terms of employment, region j is X 
times more controlling (attractive) than the average for Switzerland. 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 NATIONAL RELATIONS: PROXIMITY MATTERS! 
In this section, our focus is on existing relations of control on the space of the Swiss RPSs 
alone. Each observation thus links a final owner (owned by no other national or international 
firm) with a subsidiary, each of them located in one of the RPSs defined above. Thus, if a 
relation implies an owner of subsidiary located beyond this space, it is excluded
8. The 
observations are summarised in Table 3. 
TABLE 3: INTER-RPS CONTROLLING RELATIONS 
Source: Who owns Whom database 2003, Orell Füssli 
Of the 7,138 existing relations between the RPSs, 73.2% are internal relations (the owner and 
the entity owned belong to the same RPS). These are shown on the diagonal of Table 3. 
Shares in firms are particularly affected by proximity, to belonging to the purchaser's target 
RPS. Thus 91.7% of owned companies in the Oberland are owned internally. The most 
"extravert" region shows a rate of 61.3% (Graubünden). 
Reasoning on the basis of controlled companies in the spaces (reading Table 3 horizontally), 
we note that certain regions control only a fairly modest portion of the total of affiliated 
                                                 
8 The guiding principle in these analysis is always the concept of final control. For example, if ARPS owns Boutside RPS and 
Boutside RPS owns CRPS, the relations ARPS-Boutside RPS and Boutside RPS-CRPS are ignored, preserving only the relation between 
ARPS-CRPS.. 
RPS Jura Basel Bern Geneva Graubünden Lausanne Eastern CH Oberland Ticino Valais Zurich Total
Jura 404 11 37 22 5 22 11 1 1 0 62 576
Basel 5 646 30 12 8 10 9 0 0 0 124 844
Bern 62 8 3 7 1 5 3 7 9 0 2 06 8 4 9 9
Geneva 92 81 2 3 2 8 0 4 4 1 0 0 2 57 6 5 1 4
Graubünden 17641 2 7 1 1 8 061 3 7 2 0 8
Lausanne 20 20 23 23 0 285 11 0 1 4 58 445
Eastern CH 82 72 61 0 1 9 7 9 0 7 1 7 0 2 0 5 1 , 2 1 7
Oberland 03 1 21 3 1 14 2006 6 9
Ticino 6 13 6 12 4 6 15 0 133 0 47 242
Valais 4 11 6 19 2 27 1 2 0 72 12 156
Zurich 25 110 71 46 35 46 112 0 11 2 1,910 2,368














companies (right hand column of Table 3) in their region. The Valais (46.2%), Ticino (55.0%) 
and the Oberland (60.9%) have low rates of own control compared with Zurich (80.7%), or 
Basel (76.5%). The involvement of one system in other can also reach interesting proportions. 
Zurich is, for example, the owner of other RPSs to degrees varying from 7.7% to 19.4%. It is 
virtually always the best represented "foreign" owner. We thus reveal that the inter-RPS 
relations are the source of notable imbalances, although this type or relation represent only 
26.8% of the sample.  
Similarly, we could ask ourselves which are the regions that attract the most investments from 
the various RPSs. Apart from their own region, nearly all regions show a clear preference for 
that of Zurich. However, as mentioned above, Zurich is the system with the largest own 
ownerwhip. Zurich is thus an attractive region (favourite destination of a large number of 
RPSs), controlling (highly present in the other RPSs) and independent (high rate of own 
ownership). 
TABLE 4 : NATIONAL RPSS PERFORMANCE INDEXES 
Source: table drawn up by authors 
The figures for own control are not highly dispersed. This can be explained fairly easily by 
the clear preference on the part of the RPSs for holding shares in companies within their own 
systems. On the other hand, control and attractiveness (non-weighted) reveal highly dispersed 
figures and particularly because of Zurich, which clearly dominates the other Swiss regions in 
these areas. In the non-weighted figures in Table 4, we clearly see the different factors 
reflected in the analysis in Table 3. Zurich controls four times more companies, is 2.6 times 
more attractive, and presents an own ownership figure of 1.2 times higher than the average.  
The weighting considerably reduces the gaps between the systems. In terms of control, Zurich 
is not longer ahead and it is Bern that dominates the other regions of Switzerland. Zurich 
nevertheless remains in the upper part of the hierarchy of regions. The sparsely populated 
region of Graubünden climbs in this analysis, whereas the eastern Switzerland shows a large 
loss.  
In terms of attractiveness, the regions of Graubünden, the Oberland and Geneva show the best 
results. Zurich falls slightly below the national average. The weighting here particularly 
reduces the gaps regarding performance: there is only a difference of 0.2 point separating the 
highest from the lowest. 
Own control
RPS Not weighted Not weighted Weighted Not weighted Weighted
Jura 1.1 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.9
Basel 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.1 1.0
Bern 1.1 1.3 2.0 0.7 0.9
Geneva 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1
Graubünden 0.9 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.2
Lausanne 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.0
Eastern CH 1.1 1.1 0.7 1.8 1.0
Oberland 0.9 0.0 0.2 0.2 1.1
Ticino 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.9
Valais 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0
Zurich 1.2 4.0 1.7 2.6 0.9
Control Attractiveness  13
4.2  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
In this section, we focus on the relations between the RPSs and foreign firms. Initially, it 
should be noted that the number of companies owned by Swiss firms is largely  understated 
since we have no information about the number of firms that are controlled abroad by firms 
that are under direct Swiss control. On the other hand, it was possible to identify not only the 
Swiss firms that are directly controlled from abroad but also firms controlled indirectly
9. Even 
if the direct relations among the foreign firms are not known, it was possible to identify the 
indirect links. In fact, some 1,299 firms are controlled, via Switzerland, by other foreign 
firms. 
TABLE 5 : INTERNATIONAL CONTROL RELATIONS 
Source : table drawn up by authors 
Table 5 shows that 5,310 foreign firms are owned by Swiss firms, and 3,709 Swiss firms are 
owned by foreign ones. It can thus be noted that although our data does not permit us to 
identify indirect control relationships beyond Switzerland's borders, the RPSs taken together 
nevertheless show a clearly positive balance regarding foreign firms (+1,601)
10. 
The database states the nationality of the companies owned by Swiss firms, but not the 
foreign owners of Swiss firms. Table 6 shows the nations for whose firms the Swiss RPSs 
own majority shares. Germany, with 13.5% of the relations, is the country that attracts the 
most investment from Swiss companies. Switzerland's neighbouring countries (Germany, 
France, Austria and Liechtenstein) represent 1,566 cases of Swiss ownership (with the 41 
from Liechtenstein), i.e. 29.5% of the sample.  
Although geographical proximity may appear decisive when considering the importance of 
Germany, is it considerably less clear when examining the other countries that emerge. The 
USA (8.7%), Great Britain (8.4%), China (3.5%) or Japan (1.9%) prove that firms' interest in 
controlling companies clearly goes beyond the constraints linked to geographical distances. 
                                                 
9 Again respecting the principle of the final owner, if AForeign owns BSwitzerland and BSwitzerland owns CSwitzerland, it is the relations 
AForeign-BSwitzerland and AForeign-CSwitzerland that are taken into consideration. 
10 However, the number of companies controlled indirectly could also be considerable. In the case of Switzerland, for 
example, some 2,482 firms are directly controlled from abroad, with 1,227 being controlled indirectly. Moreover, it should be 
recalled that via these companies, 1,299 foreign companies are indirectly controlled by foreign firms.  
RPS
Jura 335 6.3% 242 6.5%
Basel 935 17.6% 298 8.0%
Bern 203 3.8% 133 3.6%
Geneva 400 7.5% 522 14.1%
Graubünden 29 0.5% 55 1.5%
Lausanne 514 9.7% 235 6.3%
Eastern CH 683 12.9% 400 10.8%
Oberland 30 . 1 % 1 60 . 4 %
Ticino 62 1.2% 194 5.2%
Valais 80 . 2 % 3 91 . 1 %
Zurich 2,138 40.3% 1,575 42.5%
Total 5,310 100.0% 3,709 100.0%
Swiss owners Foreign owners  14
The fourth column of the table shows the RPS that is the most involved in each of these 
countries: Zurich is always ahead, as the results of Table 5 already rendered predictable. 
TABLE 6 : FAVOURITE TARGET NATIONS FOR SWISS INTERESTS 
Source: Orell Füssli databases 
As in the previous section, we propose an assessment of the various RPSs in terms of control, 
attractiveness and own control
11 but this time on an international level. From Table 7, we see 
that Zurich is largely ahead in terms of the non-weighted ownership index but also regarding 
that for attractiveness. Still in non-weighted terms, Basel and Eastern Switzerland have a high 
rate of ownership, and Geneva and Eastern Switzerland are high on the attractiveness scale.  
As for the national comparison, the weighting reduces the dispersion regarding performances, 
although major differences remain: particularly in terms of ownership. Basel thus becomes the 
region with the highest level of control, closely followed by Zurich. Lausanne, Geneva and 
Eastern Switzerland are also above the average. Zurich and Geneva are clearly the most 
attractive regions for foreign investments. Ticino, to a lesser extent, is also considered to be 
an attractive destination. The attractiveness of Zurich and Geneva is somewhat offset, when 
weighted, by a fairly sharp decrease in their own control indices. With Ticino, Geneva 
becomes the region with the least own control. On the other hand, the low attractiveness of 
Bern permits the region to obtain the highest index for own control. 
 
                                                 
11 For own control, the results presented here are global, i.e. national and international. Thus, the number of internal links was 
considered as compared with the total (internal, inter-regional and international) of owned companies in the territory. 
Rank Target nation Subsidiaries Most implicated RPS (No.)
1 Germany 715 Zurich (280)
2 United States 463 Zurich (215)
3 Great Britain 444 Zurich (210)
4 France 391 Zurich (117)
5 Italy 240 Zurich (84)
6 China 187 Zurich (73)
7 Holland 181 Zurich (80)
8 Austria 179 Zurich (70)
9 Spain 136 Zurich (48)
10 Luxembourg 105 Zurich (62)
11 Belgium 103 Zurich (38)
12 Japan 99 Zurich (41)
13 Singapore 95 Zurich (45)
14 Australia 90 Zurich (42)
15 Brazil 85 Zurich (26)
16 Sweden 82 Zurich (39)
17 Canada 71 Zurich (27)
18 Caiman Islands 63 Zurich (48)
19 Bermuda 58 Zurich (26)
20 Czech Republic 58 Zurich (30)
…… … …
Total 140 nations 5,310 Zurich (2,138)  15
TABLE 7 : INTERNATIONAL RPSS PERFORMANCE INDEXES 
Source : own elaboration 
The own control figures in Table 7 have the advantage of providing us with clear information 
concerning the relatively low level of dispersion of the results, i.e. all are fairly close to the 
average. They do not, however, indicate the proportions in which the RPSs do in fact have 
own control. In fact, the integration of international relations clearly questions own control on 
the part of the RPSs. On a national level, only the Valais (46.2%) controlled less than half the 
subsidiaries on its territories. By integrating the subsidiaries of foreign companies within the 
calculation, most regions fall below this threshold: Ticino (30.5%), Geneva (31.7%), the 
Valais (36.9%) or even Lausanne (41.9%) control only a fairly small proportion of the 
subsidiaries located on their territory. Bern (58.7%), Basel (56.6%) and Eastern Switzerland 
(56.1%) become the regions that emerge as the leaders for this parameter. 
4.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESULTS  
4.3.1  Comparison of regional, national and international levels  
The above sections analysed ownership structures on a national and international level. The 
present section is aimed at identifying an overall image of the phenomenon. It is a question of 
examining how the production systems, homogeneous from the point of view of their 
specialisation, organise their financial relations at different spatial levels.  
Two initial findings should be stated. Firstly, and within the national relations, it is the intra-
RPS relations that are most clearly represented (73.2%). On this level, proximity is of central 
importance. This, however, is placed in some doubt by the second, highly significant issue: 
the importance of the international relations. In our case, of the 16,157 relations analysed, 
9,019 (55.8%) are international
12. This clearly confirms the image of Switzerland as a highly 
internationalised country.  
                                                 
12 And, moreover, without taking into consideration the 1,299 controlling relations between foreign firms with Swiss firms as 
the intermediaries. 
Own control
RPS Not weighted Not weighted Weighted Not weighted Weighted
Jura 1.1 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8
Basel 1.2 1.9 2.4 0.9 1.0
Bern 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.6
Geneva 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.5 2.1
Graubünden 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6
Lausanne 0.9 1.1 1.7 0.7 1.0
Eastern CH 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.2 0.8
Oberland 1.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4
Ticino 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.1
Valais 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3
Zurich 1.0 4.4 2.3 4.7 2.1
Control Attractiveness  16
It could be added, on this subject, that 42.7% of the firms owned in the RPSs are 
international, 42.0% are internal and 15.4% are in the hands of another Swiss RPS. These 
proportions put the results obtained in the section on national relationships into clear 
perspective, since the indices regarding ownership structure obtained are based on far fewer 
relations than for the international section. From the point of view of owned companies in the 
RPSs, 48.2% of relations are internal, 34.2% are owned by foreign firms, and 17.6% are 
owned by firms in other RPSs. The comment that the international indices are calculated 
using a much higher number of relations should thus be reiterated.  
By observing the weighted results (Tables 4 and 7) only, it can be noted that the dispersion of 
performances is extremely low for national attractiveness and for own control. The major 
differences appear at the international level and regarding national control. It is thus 
essentially in these criteria that a significant differentiation between RPSs can take place. 
4.3.2  Linking the structure of ownerships and the specific characteristics of 
the RPSs 
Is it possible to establish a link between the ownership structure of the various Swiss RPSs as 
it appears in Table 4 and 7 on the one hand, and between the economic profile of these 
different RPSs as it appears in several recent studies on the economy of the various regions of 
Switzerland on the other (Corpataux and Crevoisier 2004; Crevoisier et al., 2001; Roth and 
Crevoisier, 2004) 
The  financial regions of Zurich and Geneva occupy the leading positions within the 
hierarchy of ownership structures. They are by far the most attractive regarding foreign 
investments, and exert considerable control at every level. This confirms their role as a hub 
for international investments, and particularly in the area of finance (Roth and Crevoisier, 
2004). On a national level, Zurich also functions as a central location for numerous services: 
the main import and distribution companies and the major banks and insurance companies 
serving the national market have their headquarters in Zurich. This is not the case for Geneva, 
which is practically an enclave within French territory and whose economy is above all 
oriented around international activities. The degree of own control of the two systems is 
relatively low, and particularly for Geneva.  
The  Basel region occupies an intermediate position. The headquarters of the largest 
pharmaceutical and chemical companies,
13 it has a twin vocation: industrial and financial. 
Over the last twenty years, however, the pharmaceutical companies have expanded 
internationally to a considerable extent. The activities that remain in Basel are increasingly 
focused on the management of these large, global concerns and less and less on the industrial 
aspects. The presence of prestigious financial institutions such as the Bank for International 
Settlements, or the Swiss Bankers Association further reinforces this financial profile. All this 
is reflected in the control exerted by Basel at a national, but above all international, level. 
However, and unlike Zurich or Geneva, Basel does not really attract international investors. It 
does not have a hub function.  
                                                 
13 The giants Novartis and Roche are the concerns that inflate the indices for the region to the greatest extent.   17
The conurbation of Bern, the capital of Switzerland, is traditionally the central location for 
numerous activities liked to the post service, telecommunications, railways, and agricultural 
and agro-food activities. It is also the region with the highest degree of own control. This 
should be considered in comparison with its moderate attractiveness. Lausanne is considered 
to the central location within western Switzerland. These two regions thus have high own 
control indexes on a national level. Bern is extremely low on the international scale. If 
Lausanne has a much higher degree of international control, this is largely explained by the 
presence of the headquarters of Nestlé in the region – a company that is by no means 
representative of the general profile of the region.  
The industrial regions of Eastern Switzerland and the Jura present extremely similar profiles. 
They vary little from the "average RPS" except for national control: a criterion for which both 
regions have fairly low performances (0.7 and 0.5 respectively). These regions are generally 
considered to be fairly internationalised, but when compared with the regions of Zurich, Basel 
or Geneva, this characteristic is considerable attenuated.  
Finally, the tourist regions of Graubünden, the Bernese Oberland and the Valais are at the 
lower end of the hierarchy. These regions have a low level of own control and are not 
attractive to international investors. The Graubünden region is an exception, with a high level 
of national control that we are unable to explain. These regions nevertheless remain attractive 
for Swiss investors. 
Finally, the Ticino  region has a fairly heterogeneous profile. The traditional activities of 
tourism and of serving as the location for production subsidiaries for firms in Switzerland's 
German-speaking region have declined over the last twenty years. Over the same period, the 
financial centre of Lugano, highly oriented towards Italy and partly controlled from Zurich, 
was in the process of developing. The entire system is highly open to the exterior and marked 
by its border with Italy. All this explains the extremely low levels of own control and of 
control. 
4.4 PLACING THE RESULTS IN PERSPECTIVE 
All the analysis presented in this study is based on ownership structures among companies for 
which the size is unknown. In the database used, reliable information on the size and the 
number of employees is only available for a minority of companies. This forced us to work on 
the hypothesis of the entities being of a uniform size. Thus, a link between two SMEs was 
handled here in the same way as a link between two major companies. It is therefore clear that 
the interpretation of these statistics becomes delicate. On the other hand, the database offers 
one rare advantage: it states the names of all companies concerned. This enabled us to carry 
out research with a view to additional information. We were thus able to note that the larger 
groups, identified thanks to data on what they owned, correspond to the giants on the Swiss 
stock exchange, the Swiss Market Index. We can therefore conclude that the number of 
companies controlled is a reliable indicator of the importance of the groups, and at least for 
the larger among them.  
Another aspect that limited this study was the spatial organisation of the individual company. 
In fact, this was only taken into account to a very limited extent since the analysis is based on   18
the location of the headquarters alone. The spatial impact of a control / dependency relation 
can thus be distorted by the dispersion of a multi-establishment  company over several 
regional systems. Ideally, the impact should be broken down among the various 
establishments, but this has naturally not been the case because the database is related to the 
financial relations (share capital owned) and not legal ones (links between headquarters and 
their establishments). 
Control and dependency among the companies has been defined in the study as a relation of 
equity capital ownership of more than 50%. Behind this purely statistical value, in reality, 
hides a completely different complexity. First of all, the financial control over a company 
does not always necessitate such a portion of equity capital. Much lower degrees of ownership 
can be decisive at shareholders general meetings. A comprehension of further dimensions is 
necessary for an even more delicate issue – that of evaluating the degree of decision-taking 
autonomy of a subsidiary. One could, for example, cite the criterion of the place of the entity 
concerned within the group's global strategy, including its level of specialisation, the intensity 
of its exchanges with other entities in the group, and the group's positioning in the technical 
division of labour (Dupuy and Gilly, 1995). On a meso-economic level, the only links clearly 
integrated within this study are those of a financial nature. The financial nature constitutes a 
necessary dimension but one that is not sufficient to judge the decision-taking power of a 
company and even more so of a region. 
5 CONCLUSIONS   
Does the spatial analysis of ownership structure between companies in Switzerland make it 
possible to reveal an overall vision of the economic fabric of the country? If so, does this 
vision correspond to any of the theories taken into consideration for this study?  
On a regional scale first of all, it is striking to note that 48.2 of all subsidiaries owned in 
Switzerland are owned by a company located in the same RPS. If we add to this the 
considerable number of independent companies that are not taken into account in this study, it 
can be noted that proximity still plays a decisive role. The spatial entities initially taken into 
account for the analysis are systems that are characterised by economic specialisations 
compared with the rest of the country. In each region, an organisation's proximity is thus 
superposed on a joint specialisation and geographical proximity: the RPSs of Switzerland are 
largely coherent and independent.  
The image of inter-regional relations is then superposed on this first image. Compared to the 
proportion of internal relations, the portion of inter-regional relations can appear negligible 
(17.6% of subsidiaries are controlled from another RPS). These relations are nevertheless 
important because inter-regional control is considerably hierarchised, leading to the 
emergence of controlling regions and controlled regions. There is thus always a spatial 
division of labour at the national level. At its peak are the central conurbations of the Swiss 
plateau (Bern, Zurich and to a lesser degree Basel and Lausanne), which play the role of a 
central location controlling the national market.   19
The type of relations that must doubtlessly be considered as being the most important is 
nevertheless that of those on an international level. It is their number (34.2% of subsidiaries in 
Switzerland are controlled from abroad, meaning twice as many than those controlled by 
another RPS) and their distribution that make them the most discriminating type of ownership 
participation. Firstly, their distribution varies considerably among the regions, which can be 
seen from comparing the national and international indices (Tables 4 and 7). Moreover, their 
number is greater. The international ownership indices are thus calculated on the basis of 
5,310 relations, while on a national level the basis is 1,913 relations.  
To understand these international relations, it appears that two explanations are necessary: one 
based on the logic of control by the major companies, and another on the logic of the financial 
centres.  
The logic of the control by major companies places the regions of Basel and Lausanne in a 
controlling situation, but not on a level of attractiveness regarding international investments. 
In fact, the location of the three largest Swiss multi-nationals Novartis, Roche (in Basel) and 
Nestlé (in the Lausanne regions) largely explains the positions of the regions in which these 
companies have their headquarters.  
The logic of the financial centre is based on a system, a milieu considered to be propitious by 
foreign investors. In line with the Global City described by Sassen, the financial regions of 
Zurich, Geneva and to a lesser extent Ticino attract international investments on a massive 
scale, because foreign investors see these areas as offering the best opportunities.  
Zurich is the best example of where these two types of logic combine, since a large proportion 
of its local financial fabric consists of giants in the highly internationalised banking and 
insurance sector, such as UBS AG, Credit Suisse, Swiss Reinsurance, Swiss Life Holding, 
and to which the industrial giant ABB Ltd. can also be added. These groups partly explain the 
control index for Zurich, but the mass of smaller owners remains the most important.  
Graph 1 shows the relation between the control and the attractiveness of Switzerland's 
regions. Attractiveness appears to depend on the density of the financial activities, whereas 
control is partly explained by the presence of the giants on the Swiss Market Index. The 
superiority of Zurich is somewhat striking. The weighted indices were nevertheless used in 
order to create the graph. Without this weighting, the Zurich system's performance would 
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GRAPHIC 1: WEIGHTED INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AND ATTRACTIVITY INDICES OF RPSS 
Source: graph drawn up by authors 
The geographical proximity factor completely fails to hold true on an international level. The 
main player, Zurich, is equally capable of investing in its European neighbours as it is capable 
of doing in more remote countries such as the USA, Great Britain or even China. The Zurich 
system clearly shows its capacity for handling this type of difficulty, in the same way as the 
global cities behave. Its specialisation in the financial sector is doubtlessly decisive here.  
This being the case, what can we deduce regarding the variances regarding autonomy in the 
various regions of Switzerland? While internal relations stress the independence of the 
regions, the importance of the international relations demonstrates that autonomy does not 
consist of an autarchic approach, but resides in a region's s capacity for managing its internal 
and external relations in parallel. In this light, the Zurich region is without doubt the most 
autonomous, in the sense that it manages to handle both national and international controlling 
relations and attractiveness while maintaining an average level of own control. Basel is high 
within the controlling hierarchy at all levels – regional, national and international – but not 
particularly attractive. Geneva is international but has a low level of own control and is not 
well integrated within the national economy. Bern and Lausanne are at the top of the 
hierarchy regarding control of the national economy, and present a different profile on an 
international level. The industrial regions achieve average performances, but control few other 
entities within the country. Their autonomy thus above all appears to be linked to their 
integration within an international-scale sector. Their case, in fact, appears to correspond 
fairly well to the theories regarding the RPSs: these regions exert their own control while 
managing their relations with the exterior, yet without being integrated within a spatial 
hierarchy. Finally, the tourist regions are revealed as being the least autonomous, fairly 




























































































The overall picture that emerges is thus far richer than suggested when applying each theory 
in an isolated manner. 
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